The events in Ukraine as they have unfolded have captured frontpage headlines in most of the Western media. And although I do not follow the Russian media, there is no doubt that these events have made a similar splash there. However, the perspectives and conclusions differ greatly.
A case can be made for the Russian position as well as that of the makeshift authority in Kiev. There is nothing much surprising in this if you have observed the course of the political history of Ukraine since 1991, when it became a full-fledged country for the first time. Already the delineation of the new country’s borders posed potential difficulties; they encompassed peoples of very different ethnicities, language groups, histories and political cultures. More troubling, however, was the fact that this territory lay between Russia and the most easterly extension of the European Union, that is, of NATO and its key player, the U.S.A. Influences, direct or indirect, originating from each side have regularly mixed or butted against each other here since 1991.
The inability of the elected governments and oligarchic presidents in Kiev to make progress in eradicating widespread corruption and successfully managing the faltering Ukrainian economy led to the need to seek outside help. Both the EU and Russia made
offers of economic assistance, both with their own interests in mind.
Russia was wary not only of losing former political and economic influence in an area adjacent to its borders but also of the potential extension of military presence by NATO further eastward.
The Western lobby, on the other hand, envisioned economic access to a market of 46 million inhabitants and perhaps further limiting Russian clout on the world stage. When the Ukrainian president, in a pressure situation, chose the Russian offer over that of the EU, Western interests leapt into action, helping to fuel a “popular” demonstration against the government. When the situation became violent, the Ukrainian president fled the country and sought asylum in Russia. This resulted in the formation of a so-called new government authority in Kiev. In a matter of hours, it passed legislation that the significant ethnic Russian minority in the eastern part of Ukraine perceived as an attack on their community—a community which had also been the strongest base of support for the now-discredited president.
This community is reluctant to recognize the new authority in Kiev, which it considers to be loaded with ultra-nationalist Ukrainians. Those in power have been travelling the country in organized units to forcibly enter government buildings and threaten or disband local or regional government agencies or elected bodies. It was on this pretext—to protect the ethnic Russian minorities—that Russia mobilized its units stationed in Crimea. The situation is nothing more than another chapter in the struggle for power by the world’s major players and we can only hope that they will resolve this peacefully.
Little has been felt in the area where I work, in the country’s most westernly oblast of Transcarpathia, except for the aggressive appearance of organized units supposedly representing the new authority in Kiev. For the ethnically mixed population of Transcarpathia, neither the Russian line nor the nationalist Ukrainian line is enticing. A system offering a little more democracy, autonomy and economic improvement with less corruption is what is needed.
This is perhaps only a dream. For the ethnic minority Reformed Church of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, there is little to do except to pray.
